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The Ideology and Praxis of Shi'ism 
in the Iranian Revolution 
SHAHROUGH AKHAVI 
University of South Carolina 
The Iranian revolution of 1979 presents a case in which religion has stimu- 
lated profound social change, rather than serving only as a basis for social 
integration. Although scholars have recently been reminded of the revolution- 
ary potential of religious commitments, the view that religion tends to inhibit 
large-scale social change continues to enjoy currency. It may be that, in the 
light of events in Iran in the last five years, observers of Islamic societies will 
now be tempted to overstress the revolutionary tendencies of that great world 
religion. Yet it is difficult to exaggerate the force and depth of feeling which 
Shi'i belief and practice has generated in Iran for the purpose of the structural 
transformation of society. 
There is, however, the risk of reifying the concept of Shi'ism, and thus care 
must be taken to identify the most important aspects in both the doctrinal/ 
ideological and the practical/behavioral dimensions. What frequently has 
been termed Shi'ism in recent commentary on Iranian society and politics has 
perhaps led us into the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Behind the concept 
lurk elements of real political, social, and economic life. We need to focus on 
the fact that human beings are attributing varying meanings to Shi'ism, and 
the observer must identify the diverse individuals and groups for whom the 
point of reference is Shi'ism in all their intellectual and organizational variety. 
The conclusion of this article is that Shi'ism can and has meant different things 
to different social actors. Its adepts and practitioners in both the prerevolu- 
tionary and revolutionary periods have demonstrated varieties of thought and 
action almost such as to require the use of terms like "polycentrism" to 
characterize Shi'ism. 
THE QUESTION OF MODELS 
The literature on the historical and political sociology of Iran has generated 
several models which may be useful in helping us to understand the role of the 
This study was originally presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, New York, New York, 3-6 September 1981. I am grateful to the following col- 
leagues for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this article: Ervand Abrahamian, 
George E. Delury, Nikki R. Keddie, Houshang E. Chehabi, and M. Crawford Young. 
I Guenter Lewy, Religion and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974). 
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state in the country's social evolution. Soviet scholars surveying the various 
eras of Iranian history have tended to apply class analysis based on changes in 
the mode of production.2 A second attempt to provide an appropriate model 
for the study of the Iranian state centers on the application of the concept of 
patrimonialism. This effort stresses the absence of feudal forms and structures 
in an otherwise basically medieval authoritarian system.3 A third model, 
directed more specifically at the nineteenth-century Iranian state but with 
important implications for its twentieth-century counterpart, focuses on the 
concept of oriental despotism. This last effort is more satisfying than that 
listed first above because the analyst brings greater sensitivity to the empirical 
evidence.4 Somewhat along the same lines, other specialists have directed 
attention to the phenomenon of the rentier state "whose sudden acquisition of 
enormous revenue sources leads to its hypertrophy. ..."5 More recently, 
dissatisfaction with existing models in the literature has led one observer to 
advance "bourgeois monarchical capitalism" as a substitute in the belief in 
its greater explanatory value.6 
One is struck by the usefulness of most of these models. The Soviet interest 
in identifying different stages in the evolution of modes of production has the 
advantage of reminding us that the subject matter can best be approached 
within the framework of political economy. The stress on patrimonialism, in 
its turn, is of great interest inasmuch as it suggests the absence of intermediate 
autonomous groups with legal prerogatives of their own to defend and pro- 
mote their interests. Oriental despotism, especially in the amalgamation of 
both variants (Marx's stress on "weak society" and Engels's emphasis on 
"strong state"), is of great importance for the analysis of the Pahlavi state. 
The concept of the rentier state suggests excessive growth in one sector- 
here, petroleum-at the expense of others and the evolution of a brittle and 
fragile sociopolitical and economic infrastructure that appears deceptively 
intact until fundamentally challenged. 
It is at this point that I would like to advance the notion of corporatism. 
This concept permits an understanding of the nature of the state in terms of the 
dimensions of political participation and legitimacy. The impact of any state 
2 Ahmad Ashraf, "Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Bourgeoisie in Iran," in 
Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, Michael Cook, ed. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1970), 308-32. 
3 James A. Bill, "Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3:4 (October 1972), 417-34. 
4 Ervand Abrahamian, "Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran," International Journal 
of Middle East Studies, 5:1 (January 1974), 3-31. 
5 M. Crawford Young, personal communication. For the Iranian example, see Hossein Mah- 
davy, "Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran," in 
Studies in Economic History, Cook, ed., 428-67. 
6 Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1979), 
38-63. 
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on its society will be in relation to the degree of its legitimacy among mem- 
bers of the political community, as well as according to the nature of their 
participation in politics. A loose form of corporatism (lacking the historic 
features of Gleichschaltung associated with European corporate systems of 
the 1930s and 1940s) was the historical solution of the Pahlavi state 
(1926-1979). In the end, corporatism led to the bureaucratization of the 
state's power and of the regime attempts to control mass participation. In the 
formulation of public policy, the objective of Muhammad Riza Pahlavi, shah 
since 1941, was to maximize the people's support for the state and minimize 
their demands upon it.7 
In corporate state systems, interests are centered in units that are "singular, 
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically-ordered, functionally differenti- 
ated." The state creates such units and licenses them to provide a monopoly 
of representation in designated functional areas. There is, however, no ques- 
tion of such units, once licensed, becoming free of the state. In fact, they must 
observe limits upon their activity which are set by the state through constitu- 
tional, statutory, or administrative codes.8 Such arrangements are well suited 
to the strategy of maximizing supports while minimizing demands. And al- 
though the Pahlavi state was not able to mobilize power to the degree that 
some have suggested, it did have formidable repressive capacity when the 
regime chose to apply repression. 
Yet, the corporatism advanced by the Pahlavi state contained a critical 
weakness. In an area of the world where the religious basis of political 
legitimacy is of central importance, the Pahlavi state so excluded Shi'ism that 
it failed to gain religiously sanctioned moral acceptance. Nor did the regime 
come even remotely close to meshing its corporatist structure with the salva- 
tionist yearnings of Shi'ites-especially the petite bourgeoisie and those at the 
bottom of the economic pyramid. In both prospect and retrospect one can see 
that this failure was due to two things: the coextensiveness of the religious and 
political spheres in Islam, and the abiding determination of Iranian Shi'ites to 
withhold their approval from the shah's claim to legitimacy. This is not to say 
that Shi'i doctrine categorically rejects the legitimacy of all temporal rulers. 
However, at best, the authority of such a ruler is subject to review, and it may 
be denied entirely; the precept that awards ultimate legitimate rule to the 
7 Myron Weiner, "Political Participation," in Crises and Sequences of Political Develop- 
ment, Leonard Binder, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 161. 8 Philip C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in The New Corporatism, Freder- 
ick Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 93-94. 
As Houshang Chehabi has pointed out, classical corporatism features-in the case of au- 
thoritarian types of corporatism-very strict vertical integration of capitalists and labor by branch 
of activity. In the Iranian case, such rigorous integration did not exist, although the regime had 
begun this process in the 1960s so that, by the time of the revolution, one could speak of it in 
embryo. 
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Imam alone has been utilized as doctrinal justification for rebellion against an 
impious ruler.9 
The Pahlavi variant of corporatism was structurally flawed in consequence. 
A wide gap existed between the corporatist organization of the economy and 
political life, on the one hand, and the continued if enfeebled ability of the 
religious forces to resist cooptation into the institutions of the Pahlavi system 
on the other. Through this gap were to pour the revolutionary masses, 
eventually overthrowing the old regime and initiating a new state order that 
remains difficult to categorize. 
THE STRUCTURE OF PAHLAVI CORPORATISM 
The structure of Pahlavi corporatism can best be illuminated by discussion of 
its institutions and public policies. This dual emphasis will highlight matters 
of organization and social mobility. 
There is consensus that the Iranian political system from the time of World 
War II took on the following forms: 1941-53, pluralist politics; 1953-63, 
authoritarian mobilization politics; 1963-79, monarchical absolutism and bu- 
reaucratization of power. Although the features of the last period had their 
origin and development in the earlier years, this discussion will focus on the 
final period of the shah's rule. 
During these sixteen years the major institutions of the state were the 
monarchy, the intelligence services, the military, the central planning appa- 
ratus, and certain key ministries, such as interior and information. There was 
a party structure, but it remained an ancillary feature of the regime and failed 
in its purpose to mobilize masses and intellectuals behind the shah's "White 
Revolution. " 
The central role of the monarchy is so obvious and has so often been cited'? 
9 A debate is taking place in the literature on the question of doctrinal principles and rule. 
Arguing in the tradition that the doctrine sanctions clergy assertiveness and revolutionary rejec- 
tion of impious rule (zulm) are A. K. S. Lambton, "Quis Custodiet Custodes?" Studia Islamica, 
5:2 (1956), 125-48, and 6:1 (1956), 125-46; Nikki R. Keddie, "The Roots of the 'Ulama"s 
Power in Modem Iran," Studia Islamica, 29 (1969), 31-53; Hamid Algar, Religion and State in 
Iran, 1785-1906 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Leonard Binder, "The Proofs 
of Islam," in Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb, George Makdisi, ed. (Leiden: Brill, 
1965), 118-40; and Joseph Eliash, "The Ithna"ashari Shi'i Juristic Theory of Political and Legal 
Authority," Studia Islamica, 29 (1969), 17-30. In a later article, "Some Misconceptions Con- 
cerning Shi'i Political Theory," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9:1 (February 
1979), 9-25, Eliash admonishes against too literal an interpretation of Shi'i doctrine on zulm. As 
against the traditional view, the revisionists suggest that Shi'i doctrine has been quietistic on the 
question of rule. Consult Said Amir Arjomand, "Religion, Political Action and Legitimate 
Domination in Shi'ite Iran: Fourteenth to Eighteenth Centuries A.D." Archives europeenes de 
sociologie, 20:1 (1979), 59-109; and Mangol Bayat, "Islam in Pahlavi and Post-Pahlavi Iran: A 
Cultural Revolution?" in Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change, John L. 
Esposito, ed. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1980), 89-94. 
10 Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1962); James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Moderniza- 
tion (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill, 1972); Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, 2d ed. 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979); Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). 
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that not much need be added beyond the note that whereas the country's 
constitution (1906-7) stipulated that the shah reign-not rule-the actions of 
this shah since 1953 were in full disregard of these provisions. Though his 
military-based monarchy may not have become an arrant "fascist-style total- 
itarian regime," I his manipulation of politics resulted in the gross violation 
of the country's fundamental law. 
The identification of the state with the monarchy, if not with the person of 
the shah, became the key objective of this ruler. He used the security services 
and the army to ensure his purpose, and the proliferation of agencies within 
the military-security establishment to accomplish his ends should cause less 
surprise than the fact that internal rivalries among chiefs of agencies did not 
surface more often than they did. Of the numerous units, "four [were] in 
some ways overt police units, and the other four [performed] various intel- 
ligence and secret police functions."12 
Since military power alone is insufficient and inefficient in administering a 
society, the army, police, and intelligence services did not serve as day-to-day 
instruments of rule. The shah had to rely upon a socioeconomic program 
which government language characterized as progressive and even "revolu- 
tionary." Because the state in many societies can mobilize such extensive 
power, it often becomes the paramount entrepreneur, as well. The shah's 
third, fourth, and fifth development plans (1962-79) were the major instru- 
ments of national integration. The expansion of the national market, under the 
aegis of national planning, into the periphery was an orchestrated effort that 
led to the sedentarization of the tribes, the capitalization of agriculture, the 
emergence of a massive oil sector, and the growth of a modest, if interna- 
tionally uncompetitive, manufacturing sector. As part of this system, two new 
classes came into increasing evidence: the middle class and the industrial 
working class. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the regime destroyed the autonomy of the organiza- 
tions of these two classes. Such organizations had already begun to emerge by 
the 1920s, and the labor movement had been a vital part of the Iranian 
political scene up to mid century, with membership approaching half a mil- 
lion. 13 After his reinstatement on the throne in 1953, the shah reacted to the 
power of the working-class organizations by creating official unions that 
became integrated into the Pahlavi state. The Ministry of Labor, moreover, 
had less to do with the organizational aspects of these unions than did the 
secret police. 14 As for the middle class, it did not enjoy independence, even 
though as a group it benefited a good deal from the modernization policies of 
II Ervand Abrahamian, "The Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," Middle East 
Research and Information Project Reports, 87 (May 1980), 25. 
12 Halliday, Iran, 76. 
13 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1982), 347-71. 
14 Halliday, Iran, 205. 
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the shah. That this class acquiesced to, but without participating in, decisions 
of the regime derived from its gains in growth from the industrialization 
policies. Deprived of decision-making authority for its institutions, especially 
the syndicates and the Chamber of Commerce, the middle class could not take 
the initiative on broad policy issues.15 But this did not matter as long as 
members of this class, as individuals, continued to enjoy prosperity. 
In summary, the Pahlavi state seemed patterned after corporate political 
systems, a chief trait of which is to keep access to the levers of power 
restricted to a small elite while establishing a hierarchical facade that purports 
to organize broad mass participation in endeavors of public choice. In evolv- 
ing the corporate structure, an ideology was fashioned which in its pronounce- 
ments stressed distribution but which in practice favored production. 
This leads, then, to the question of which groups benefited most from such 
policies and which lost the most? The capitalist middle class was probably the 
most direct beneficiary of these policies. This was largely related to the 
phenomenal increase of oil revenues after 1973, but it was also linked to 
deliberate administrative decisions already adopted in the previous decade to 
push hard for the consolidation of the middle-class, which had emerged in the 
1930s. The spread of the industrial and foreign trade markets in the following 
decades led to the rise of a more clearly identifiable middle class, which the 
shah intended to make the social basis of his state while simultaneously 
denying it real decision-making authority. A corporate group of financiers, 
investors, traders, and industrialists thus arose as a consequence of over-all 
economic growth in Iran. 
The investment ratio is a good general index of sectoral growth, and in the 
years 1962 through 1973 (the period of the third and fourth development 
plans), vast sums were channeled by the government into the economic sec- 
tors. Supplementing that effort was investment by private entrepreneurs, 
whose total investments amounted to "some two-thirds to three-quarters as 
much as the public sector .. ."16 
The relatively favorable position of private entrepreneurs may also be seen 
from figures on expenditures by urban families, as shown in Table 1. These 
data were generated by the Central Bank of Iran, and are arranged to show 
expenditure per population decile, ranked according to wealth. While expen- 
diture figures are not as useful as those on income distribution, they are 
revealing. The 1973-74 statistics show that the richest 10 percent of the 
population accounted for 38 percent of the total expenditures of the popula- 
tion, whereas the poorest 10 percent accounted for only 1.3 percent.17 
15 Bill, Politics of Iran, 53-72. 
16 Charles Issawi, "The Iranian Economy, 1925-1975: Fifty Years of Economic Develop- 
ment," in Iran under the Pahlavis, George Lenczowski, ed. (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 
1978), 137. 
17 Data for the United States in 1978 indicate that the top two quintiles showed about the same 
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TABLE 1 
Distribution of Urban Expenditure in Iran, by Decile 
Percentage of expenditure 
Decile 
(lowest to highest) 1959-60 1973-74 
1 1.7% 1.3% 
2 2.9 2.4 
3 4.0 3.4 
4 5.0 4.7 
5 6.1 5.0 
6 7.3 6.8 
7 8.9 9.3 
8 11.8 11.1 
9 16.4 17.5 
10 35.3 37.9 
SOURCE: Ervand Abrahamian, "The Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," Middle East 
Research and Information Project Reports, 87 (May 1980), 23. See also for confirmation, Firouz 
Vakil, "Iran's Basic Economic Problems: A Twenty Year Horizon," Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 25:4 (July 1977), 723-25. 
Figures for a single case are indicative, but a comparative perspective is 
more helpful. In a recent essay,18 the discrepancy between rich and poor in 
Iran under the shah is shown to have been greater than that in Egypt, where 
the economy has been historically weak. The data, shown in Table 2, are not 
strictly comparable because the figures for Egypt are based on the years 
1964-65 (cf. Iran, 1968) and households in both rural and urban areas are 
included (cf. Iran, urban households only). Yet, the statistics are of interest, 
particularly since poverty would tend to be reflected more in the rural areas in 
any case. These figures represent the situation in the late 1960s, but it has also 
been suggested that they marked an ongoing trend such that in Iran under the 
second Pahlavi shah "the rich got richer and the poor got poorer."19 
The capitalist middle class also included farmers who benefited from the 
land reform policies of the shah. The regime's critics sometimes have ignored 
the accomplishments of its land reform. It is appropriate to note that, by the 
end of the reform in 1971, the number of those who owned no land prior to the 
skew as that for Iran in 1973-74. However, the middle quintile in the case of the United States 
revealed a figure of 17.5 percent of expenditures, whereas in the Iranian case the analogous 
statistic was 11.8 percent, "suggesting the old 'small middle class equals low stability' equa- 
tion." I am grateful to George E. Delury for bringing this fact to my attention. 
18 Elias Tuma, "The Rich and the Poor in the Middle East," Middle East Journal, 34:4 
(Autumn 1980), 420. 
19 Gholam A. Liaghat, "Changes in a New Middle Class through the Analysis of Census 
Data: The Case of Iran between 1956-1966," Middle East Journal, 34:3 (Summer 1980), 349. 
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TABLE 2 
Income Distribution in Iran and Egypt (in percentage) 
Percentage of income 
Decile Iran, 1968 Egypt, 1964-65 
(poorest to richest) (urban) (urban and rural) 
1 1.2 1.5 
2 2.8 3.1 
3 3.8 4.2 
4 4.9 5.3 
5 5.9 6.5 
6 7.2 8.1 
7 8.8 10.1 
8 11.0 12.8 
9 14.7 17.3 
10 39.7 31.1 
Wealthiest 5% of population 29.7 19.2 
Gini coefficient 0.5018 0.4337 
SOURCE: Elias Tuma, "The Rich and the Poor in the Middle East," Middle East Journal, 34:4 
(Autumn 1980), 420. 
reform and became owners as a result amounted to 15 percent of the total 
number of landowners.20 
The groups that lost most heavily under the shah's programs were the 
tribes, the poor peasantry, the petite bourgeoisie (bazaar merchants, shop- 
keepers, and artisans), and the urban poor (low-income industrial workers, 
self-employed-such as taxi drivers-and the lumpenproletariat). It will be 
noted that the landed aristocracy is not included in this list of losers. The 
reason is that this class was invited, on terms favorable to it, to become part of 
the urban middle class of industrialists, financiers, and entrepreneurs, or, if 
they wished to remain in the countryside, to become partners in the large 
state-regulated agribusiness farms that were spreading throughout the country 
after the mid 1960s. The structural transformation of the Iranian countryside 
in the 1960s and 1970s which resulted from the capitalization of agriculture 
did not shift power from large landowners to the Iranian equivalent of a self- 
sufficient small-holder yeomanry. Instead, "land [was] transferred only to 
some peasants, while power in the village [was] to a great extent appropriated 
by the state."21 
20 Nikki R. Keddie, "The Iranian Village before and after Land Reform," Journal of Con- 
temporary History, 3:3 (1968), 87. 
21 Halliday, Iran, 122. Halliday's italics. 
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But of course the one stratum of society whose downward mobility under 
the shah was most consequential for the collective social action that led to the 
revolution was the clergy. The bureaucratization of power was accompanied 
by the seizure of the clergy's jobs, lands, revenues, madrasahs (theological 
colleges), and administration of shrines. The process of declassing the clergy 
might have succeeded if the shah had not insisted upon appropriating the 
clergy's last remaining resource: "the cultural symbols which in the past 
[had] been so vital in inculcating among Iranians a sense of self, an explana- 
tion of the cosmos and social reality."22 The masses that the clergy mobi- 
lized, therefore, were not only socially, economically, and politically de- 
prived, but also culturally alienated. 
THE SHI'I DOCTRINE OF AUTHORITY AND THE STATE 
The Shi'i position is based on the following beliefs: (1) Muhammad, the 
prophet of Islam, should be succeeded by his descendents, the imams; (2) 
salvation is vouchsafed to those who believe in the restoration of God's 
justice, to be accomplished by the last Imam when he reappears on earth; (3) 
every historical period requires a "proof" of God, incarnate in the line of 
these descendants. 
Iranian Shi'ites are known as Imamites or Twelvers. The Imamite Shi'ites 
believe that the prophet's rightful heirs were twelve in number. Only the first 
in this line, 'Ali, actually ruled and then only briefly (A.D. 651-56). The 
others were persecuted as a matter of official policy by the rulers of the 
Islamic community. The social mythos of Shi'ism suggests that blame for the 
death of their imams must be placed at the door of the Sunni caliphs who ruled 
the Islamic world at that time, even though there is historical evidence that 
some imams did not die a violent death. 
The practical role of the imams, except for 'Ali, consisted in spiritual 
guidance. The last Imam is believed to have disappeared as a child in the year 
A.D. 874. The faithful anticipate his return as the "One Who Arises, the 
Master of the Age, the Mahdi." His reappearance will requite the apocalyptic 
visions and expectations of the true believers. 
The doctrine of the Imamate-or rule by the Imam-addresses itself to the 
occultation of the twelfth Imam. Shi'ites must accept the fact of his absence 
for an indefinite period of history; yet, the doctrine specifies that every histor- 
ical age must feature a proof of God manifested in the Imam. It became a part 
of the doctrine, therefore, that the twelfth Imam maintained contact with his 
followers despite his phenomenal absence from the community. 
The clergy argued that the occultation of the Imam did not mean that the 
proof of God did not exist. They maintained that God commanded the Imam 
22 Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in 
the Pahlavi Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 183. 
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into hiding because of fear that he would be killed. Because the Imam was 
obeying the will of God, and God meant that there need be a proof of Him for 
every age, then the proof must be construed to exist. The complex logic is 
captured in the following explanation: 
The existence of the [proof] was necessary because the non-existence of the Imam 
? . . would have meant the . . . end of the religious injunctions, because the latter 
would have no protector. But if he .. .went into occultation by the command of God, 
and if he had the known means of mediation, then the proof continued on earth, 
because both he and the means of mediation were present. The state of occultation did 
not invalidate the presence of the proof. .. 23 
But what role was assumed by the clergy apart from articulation of Imamite 
doctrine? Gradually and indirectly, they became the transmitters of the say- 
ings, traditions, and practices of the imams and thus assumed the role of 
intermediary between the latter and the faithful. The emphasis must be upon 
the word "indirectly," because there is no doctrinal basis for arguing that the 
highest ranking clergymen, the mujtahids, received a categorical appointment 
from the imams themselves in their lifetimes to be the imams' replacements. 
Nevertheless, in a much later period, around the seventeenth century, tamper- 
ing with the doctrinal principles appears to have occurred in order to make it 
seem as though a categorical, ex ante, appointment of mujtahids had been 
granted by the imams.24 
The Imam's occultation also posed the dilemma of authority. If the commu- 
nity was to be organized, administered, and preserved according to a pattern 
that would be pleasing to God, then who was to lead? On this question the 
Imamites may be said to have equivocated. As long as they lived under Sunni 
rule, they were absolved from answering. The absence of a requirement for an 
oath of allegiance (bay'ah) to the hidden Imam until his reappearance permit- 
ted Shi'ites to be faithful and yet also acknowledge the rule of the Sunni 
caliph. However, after 1501, Imamite Shi'ism became the religion of a cen- 
tralized Iranian state under the Safavid shahs (1501-1722). It became more 
and more urgent to discuss whether or not the clergy had doctrinal grounds for 
claiming the deputyship of the imams as secular shahs now began pressing 
such claims themselves. 
Moreover, in the eighteenth century an intraclergy dispute resulted in a key 
victory on the doctrinal side for those who wanted an assertive social role for 
the clergy. The victorious faction successfully argued that the mujtahids were 
entitled to use their independent judgment in interpreting the law. A doctrinal 
principle consequently came to be used as a lever for clergy activism in social 
23 Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism: The Idea of Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism (Al- 
bany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 105. 
24 Ibid., 101. Eliash, "Some Misconceptions," has shown that ex ante appointment never 
occurred. 
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matters beyond the narrow compass of ethical and pietistic concerns of the 
past. On this view, as against that which insisted no room existed for indepen- 
dent judgment, authoritative opinions (fatwas) could now be issued anath- 
ematizing secular policies. Empowered with this prerogative, the clergy be- 
came a corporate stratum whose leaders-the mujtahids-could expect 
imitation by the masses in practical and legal matters. The most distinguished 
of the mujtahids soon came to exercise great informal political influence. 
During the time of the Qajar shahs (1796-1925), the clergy began to claim 
that the eminent mujtahids of the age were, in fact, the proofs of the Imam. 
This doctrinal shift ensued from tampering with tradition, but the clergy 
mentally justified the slight-of-hand, no doubt, on grounds of the increasingly 
intolerable acts of their secular rulers. 
What is interesting in all this is that at the time the centralized state was 
created in sixteenth-century Iran, the clergy were the state's clients. The 
creation of Shi'ism as a state religion in the 1500s was not due to influence of 
the mujtahids but rather to the decision of a Sufi leader responding to chilias- 
tic expectations rife in northwest Iran and eastern Turkey. Having conquered 
the territory of Iran, this individual began then to import Shi'ite mujtahids into 
Iran to serve in the administration of the state. Clearly, then, these clergy 
were dependent upon and vulnerable to the granting or withdrawal of the 
state's largesse and the maneuverings of the shah. In due course, many of 
even the top-ranking clergymen who were already inside the country were 
brought into the state bureaucracy. Only a minority of the mujtahids in this 
period maintained a preferred aloofness from state service. 
Doctrinally, the religious leaders legitimated Safavid temporal rule by ac- 
quiescing in the claims made by the shahs to be the descendents of the seventh 
Imam, an acquiescence which added weight to the Safavids' claim to be rulers 
of the community. These shahs came to be known by the sobriquet appropri- 
ated by them, and not contested then by the clergy-zillullah, the shadow of 
God. 
The increasing involvement of the clergy in politics in the most recent two 
centuries has had to do with a variety of causes, not all of them doctrinal. For 
instance, the increasing penetration of imperialism led the clergy to forge an 
alliance with intellectuals, artisans, and merchants. This political activism of 
the clergy did not amount to categorical challenges to the sovereignty of the 
shahs. The ruler continued to be regarded as an imperfect leader, and clergy 
protest was for the most part confined to very specific grievances against 
unjust decisions affecting local interests.25 
When a strong mujtahid challenge to the shah did occur in 1891-92 over 
the grant of a tobacco monopoly to the British, the shah quickly capitulated. 
But even then his sovereign authority was not in jeopardy. A decade later, 
25 Algar, Religion and State, passim. 
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during the constitutional revolution (1905-11), the stronger doctrinal argu- 
ment rested with anticonstitutionalist clergymen. 
Nevertheless, Shi'i doctrine contains implicit justification for clergy asser- 
tiveness. First, they have the residual right to warn the community of the 
violation of the Imam's justice. Second, doctrinal justifications could be 
found for political action in the Qur'an, for example, "You are the best 
community I have sent forth among the people, commanding the good and 
enjoining from evil," and "O you who believe, obey God, obey the prophet 
and those in authority among you." Enforcing good and preventing evil are 
seen as ultimately political acts which the entire community may undertake. 
"Those in authority among you" are considered by Shi'ites to be the imams 
and even, some believe, the mujtahids. 
In no sense, however, did the clergy advance doctrinal arguments for 
locating sovereignty in their own corporate group. When they perceived that 
their secular allies in the constitutional revolution were moving toward West- 
ern notions of popular sovereignty and republicanism, the clergy defected and 
ultimately sponsored the rise to the throne of a military officer who appeared 
to be willing to strengthen the cause of Shi'ism. It was thus ironic that this 
individual was to embark upon a series of policies which in fact led to the 
evisceration of the religious institution. Three generations later, however, the 
successors of these clergy would lead perhaps the most astounding revolution 
in modern times. 
Is there an Islamic theory of collective action? From the Sunni perspective, 
the fundamental unit of social reality is the community of believers. Collec- 
tive social action is conceived in terms of salvation, and the charisma of the 
community is the key to its attainment. The importance of community charis- 
ma and infallibility may be seen in the verse already cited-"You are the best 
community. .. . "-and in the saying, attributed to the prophet, "My com- 
munity shall never agree upon error." 
Collective social action against constituted authority is sanctioned only in 
the event of a ruler's impiety, but unanimously accepted criteria by which to 
assess the rule of princes do not exist. Moreover, no machinery evolved for 
use in applying sanctions against impious rulers. There is only the general 
guideline in the Qur'an that "there is no duty of obedience in sin."26 
In fact, revolution is considered ultimately a threat to the will of God. The 
concept of God's community cannot be faulty, for it is based upon member- 
ship of believers who have accepted rule over animals and plants as a trust 
from Him; it is organized by those whom God has sent forth to be the leaders 
of mankind. Even if a ruler be impious, the danger of revolution to the 
community is so great that overriding proof of dereliction is required before 
26 Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Concepts of Revolution," in Revolution in the Middle East, P. J. 
Vatikiotis, ed. (London: Weidenfeld, 1972), 33. 
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action is taken. In the absence of such proof, inaction may be preferable 
because a ruler cannot transcend the limits of his own mortality, and thus the 
situation can improve. 
In the Shi'i view of collective social action, the charisma of the community 
is replaced by that of the Imam. Salvation is guaranteed only through the 
implementation of the Imam's justice. The Imam "was entitled to political 
leadership as much as to religious authority, [although] his imamate did not 
depend upon his actual rule."27 Moreover, the mujtahids, as a result of the 
eighteenth-century triumph noted above, have played a role that the Sunni 
clergy have forsaken: they exercise power to issue fatwas on crucial political 
issues. 
Collective social action in the Iranian revolution is best seen in terms of 
both the ideal and material interests of those participating in it. The essentially 
Tocquevillean explanation of increasing general prosperity combined with a 
sudden change in the fortunes of a pivotal social force (here, the capitalist 
middle class, which began defecting from the regime in the mid 1970s as 
massive arms purchases led to a credit squeeze which severely restricted their 
borrowing capability, a liquidity crisis, and national borrowing in the interna- 
tional financial markets) goes some way to illuminate the weakness of the 
regime. Growing class conflict can be seen in the increase in the number of 
industrial strikes and incidents of labor turmoil in the 1970s over the previous 
decade. But indispensable to a proper understanding of the Iranian revolution 
is the Weberian notion that, in gauging interests, ideas must be seen to play an 
autonomous role. 
Yet, it would be a mistake to believe that the revolution stemmed from 
mobilization through the doctrinal principles of official Shi'ism. Though the 
revolution was led by a grand mujtahid, the Ayatalluah Ruhullah al-Musavi 
Khumayni, due emphasis must be given to the popular or folk aspects in 
considering its religious basis. On this dimension, the rituals, passion plays, 
and narrative accounts of the lives of the imams occupied a central place in the 
social drama. These rituals do not have inherent meanings. Instead, such 
meanings are attributed-as Weber argues-to the rituals by the actors in the 
drama. Within this framework, though Iranians were mobilized by one of 
Shi'ism's highest ranking official leaders, these people were really laying their 
lives on the line in order to redeem pledges to sacrifice themselves as part of a 
social order that calls for such martyrdom. The Iranian revolution came about 
through militant but basically unarmed demonstrations. The masses acquired 
weapons only at the very end when guerrilla groups attacked military depots 
and distributed weapons. 
One of the hallmarks of the demonstrations prior to the shah's departure on 
27 Wilfred Madelung, "Imama," Encyclopaedia of Islam (n.s.), III, fasc. 59-60 (Leiden: 
Brill, 1971), 1167. 
208 SHAHROUGH AKHAVI 
16 January 1979 were the passion plays. These enactments refer to the martyr- 
dom of the third Imam, Husayn, on the battlefield at the hands of the forces of 
the Sunni caliph in A.D. 680. This Imam's cause was rebellion against Sunni 
impious tyranny. Present-day renditions of his story have clear implications 
for the legitimacy of the current Iranian regime, since the passion plays have 
allegorical value. People who are martyred for Husayn's cause are considered 
to be worthy themselves of the Imam's primordial sacrifice. 
Such mass actions of collective social protest by demonstrators inspired by 
passion plays constituted efforts to be worthy of the Imam's trust on the part 
of the faithful, who thereby proved themselves members of an exalted com- 
munity. To non-Shi'ites these actions may appear irrational. If the sacrifices 
are deemed a means for actuating the mechanism of solidarity within the 
community, however, they appear as structurally essential in protecting loy- 
alty groups against disintegration.28 
The official "high religion" of Shi'ism has little to do with passion plays- 
a fact that did not deter Ayatullah Khumayni from utilizing them in mobiliz- 
ing the masses. Michael Fischer is essentially correct in arguing that the 
collective action of Iranians from October 1977 to February 1979 comprised a 
giant morality play on the national level.29 The climax in such plays is the 
imam's martyrdom, but the triggering mechanism of martyrdom is the repeat- 
ed question of participants: "May I be your ransom?" In the Christian tradi- 
tion, the sacrifice of one leads to the salvation of all. The Shi'i tradition 
requires that the sacrifice be borne equally. 
Thus, revolutionary mobilization stemmed not from ideational responses to 
abstract doctrinal elements. Instead, it derived from the conjuncture of two 
factors: (1) the latitude the doctrine provided to the mujtahids to pronounce 
social criticism of impiety, and (2) the cathartic function of the passion play. 
The revolution occurred both because the masses wanted to improve their life 
chances and because they were engaging in concrete, practical, and-for 
them-stable reactions to maintain the integrity of their community. Simul- 
taneously, Ayatullah Khumayni's use of dramaturgical symbols and his own 
occultation from society as an exile for fifteen years provided powerful lever- 
age for revolutionary action. 
REVOLUTIONARY FACTIONALISM 
Factions and splits have characterized the Iranian revolution. The cleavages 
are characteristic not only of relations between clerical and secular groups, as 
might be expected, but within the clergy itself. It is the latter which will 
28 Hans Kippenburg, "Jeder Tag 'Ashura, Jedes Grab Kerbala," in Religion und Politik im 
Iran: Mardom Nameh-Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und Gesellschaft des Mittleren Orients, Kurt 
Greussing, ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat, 1981), 217-56. 
29 Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980), 183. 
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receive attention here. In discussing such factionalism, it will be seen that the 
traditional labels of "leftist" and "rightist" do not serve the purpose of 
analysis very well. Principled coalitions, in the sense of group adherence to an 
internally consistent set of positions, have been difficult to identify. 
In discussing tactics, strategy, and policies since the revolution, one of the 
most important points to bear in mind is that the clergy did not have a political 
party until after the seizure of power. The organizational weapon, as it were, 
wielded by Ayatullah Khumayni and his associates up to the time of the 
shah's departure consisted of the informal network of urban-based preachers 
and theological seminary students. 
Upon his return to Iran, Khumayni supplemented this network with the 
Revolutionary Council (RC). Though the numerical balance between clergy 
and laymen in the RC favored the second group, the former remained much 
more unified. The RC soon became a forum of conflict between the adherents 
of former President Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr and Ayatullah Sayyid Muham- 
mad Bihishti (in many respects the eminence grise of the regime). Although 
conflict between the two men and their respective associates was not continu- 
ous, their differences were substantive and covered matters of ideology, strat- 
egy, tactics, and policy. 
The RC had five separate chairmen through its nineteen months of exis- 
tence. As many as twenty individuals served on it over this time, but member- 
ship apparently never exceeded twelve or thirteen at any given time. The 
members of the RC included (1) Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari (first chair- 
man), (2) Ayatullah Muhammad Riza Mahdavi Kani (second chairman), (3) 
Ayatullah Mahmud Taliqani (third chairman), (4) Ayatullah Muhammad 
Bihishti (fourth chairman), (5) Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr (fifth chairman), (6) 
Ayatullah Husayn 'Ali Muntaziri (Khumayni's supposedly designated suc- 
cessor), (7) Ayatullah 'Abd al-Karim Musavi Ardabili, (8) Hujjat al-Islam 
Javad Bahunar, (9) Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad 'Ali Khamanah'i, (10) Hujjat 
al-Islam 'Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani, (11) 'Abbas Shaybani, (12) Husayn 
Musavi Khamanah'i, (13) Mustafa Katira'i, (14) Mihdi Bazargan, (15) 
'Izzatullah Sahabi, (16) Ibrahim Yazdi, (17) Hasan Ibrahim Habibi, (18) 'Ali 
Akbar Mu'infar, and (19) Sadiq Qutbzadah. 
Of the clergymen, only Mutahhari and Taliqani had ties to the secular left. 
The departure of these two mujtahids in April and June 1979 respectively, 
Mutahhari through assassination and Taliqani via absense before his death in 
September, left the RC clergy united under Bihishti's guidance. 
The coalitions within the RC apparently divided themselves along the fol- 
lowing lines. Kani, Bihishti, Muntaziri, Ardabili, Bahunar, M. A. 
Khamanah'i, Rafsanjani, Shaybani, and H. M. Khamanah'i believed in (1) 
restricting political power to a self-designated elite (the clergy), (2) curtailing 
demands for autonomy by minorities, (3) encouraging activism by the clergy 
in matters of public morality, and in legislative, judicial, and executive mat- 
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ters. These are essentially "rightist" positions. But this group may also 
reasonably be said to have advocated (1) distributing the goods, values, and 
services of society more equitably, (2) seeking to enfranchise new groups in 
society, and especially the urban poor, (3) encouraging nationalization of 
certain enterprises, (4) acknowledging at least the principle of worker par- 
ticipation in the making of management decisions in the factories, (5) extricat- 
ing the Iranian economy from the world capitalist system, and (6) expropriat- 
ing property and redistributing it to the needy. 
Similarly, Bani Sadr, Bazargan, Sahabi, and Yazdi might be termed "left- 
ists" because they argued for (1) widening the scope of individual choice and 
access to the levers of power, (2) equitable distribution of goods, services, 
and values, (3) extensive enfranchisement for the downwardly mobile, (4) 
state intervention in the economy, (5) backing for workers' councils in enter- 
prises, (6) extensive economic nationalization, and (7) disengaging Iran's 
economy from the international political economy of capitalism. On the other 
hand, at other times and in varying degrees, they also urged (1) restricting 
autonomy for Iran's nationalities and minorities, (2) backing the clergy's 
activism in the legislative and judicial branches of government, and (3) in- 
stituting measures of censorship against the opposition. 
Of the remaining members of the RC, perhaps Katira'i aligned himself 
more with the "rightists," while Habibi, Mu'infar, and Qutbzadah leaned 
more toward the "leftists." In this framework, these four individuals might 
have represented swing votes. During their short tenure on the council, 
Ayatullahs Mutahhari and Taliqani probably supported the "leftists" on a 
number of issues. 
We have no idea of how the RC made policy. Its spokesman, Habibi, 
certainly never gave any public statements about procedural or substantive 
issues. We have, thus, to infer positions from events. For example, from 
December 1979 through January 1980 the northwestern province of Azarbay- 
jan was in turmoil over clashes between the adherents of the Islamic Re- 
publican Party (IRP) and the supporters of Ayatullah Muhammad Kazim 
Shari'atmadari, an eminent Azari mujtahid resident in Qumm. A delegation of 
the RC (Ayatullah Kani, Bani Sadr, and Bazargan) went to Qumm to consult 
with Shari'atmadari, who is the spiritual leader of most Azarbayjanis. Accord- 
ing to the RC alliances outlined above, the delegation was "leftward" leaning 
and therefore would be expected to have been sympathetic to the demands of 
the Azari minority. An arrangement was reached that was apparently agree- 
able to Shari'atmadari. Yet, Shari'atmadari soon denounced the "lack of 
implementation" of the plan he thought he had achieved with the trio and 
warned of civil war "if a single hair of the accord" were out of place.30 
30 Iran Times (hereafter cited as IT), 23 and 30 Azar 1358 H. Sh./14 and 21 December 1979. 
This paper, published weekly in Washington, D.C., typically consists of fourteen pages in 
Persian and two pages in English. All references to IT are to the Persian language articles. 
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In keeping with its general policy toward the nationalities, the RC majority 
apparently prevailed to prevent the carrying out of its own delegation's agree- 
ment with Shari'atmadari. A clue to what went wrong may lie in Bani Sadr's 
trenchant rejection of Kurdish autonomy demands in February 1980.31 In 
short, actors do not always behave strictly according to the labels ascribed to 
them. Moreover, positions may change over time, and assigning someone to a 
social action category on the basis of his later behavior (in this case, Bani 
Sadr's post-February 1980 sympathies for the Kurds) risks errors in analysis. 
The following issues have divided the leadership in the last four years: 
nationalities policy and communal relations, due process of law, civil rights, 
financial policy, constitutional issues, autocracy, corruption, relations with 
other powers, economic development, and education policy. Limitations of 
space prohibit detailed investigation of all of these areas, and the discussion 
below will therefore be confined to the main outline of only a few of them. 
INTRACLERGY CONFLICT 
In the period before the shah's departure, intraclergy conflict already existed. 
The divisions deepened subsequently, as a hardline (tundru) position 
crystalized against a moderate (miyanahru) one. These cleavages can best be 
viewed in the respective arguments of Ayatullahs Khumayni and 
Shari'atmadari.32 
An initial object of contention was the new political structure. Ayatullah 
Shari'atmadari had supported a broadly formulated question for the March 
1979 referendum on the future political system of the country. Ultimately, the 
narrow formulation demanded by Ayatullah Khumayni and his supporters, 
(Do you favor an Islamic Republic? Yes or no?) prevailed over Shari'at- 
madari's preferred version (What kind of political system do you want for the 
country?). 
Second, Shari'atmadari early had permitted his followers to establish a 
political party-the Muslim People's Party (MPP)-rival to the IRP, which 
had the support of the urban masses. Before its suppression in late 1979, MPP 
adherents, who were mainly from Azarbayjan, had broadly criticized many 
aspects of IRP policies and actions. 
Third, Shari'atmadari consistently used terms such as national, nationalist, 
democratic, sovereignty, whereas Khumayni even more consistently anath- 
ematized them as Western terms intended to undermine Shi'ism. 
Fourth, Shari'atmadari urged that a constituent assembly be convened to 
debate a new constitution. He strongly insisted that this body comprise duly 
elected representatives of the broad masses of the people. Khumayni coun- 
tered with the narrowly based Council of Experts, to be dominated by IRP 
31 IT, 3 Isfand 1358 H. Sh./22 February 1980. 32 An examination of the conflicts between Khumayni and Shari'atmadari may be found in 
Akhavi, Religion and Politics, 172-80. 
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clergy. The latter carried the day, with predictable consequences for provi- 
sions favored by Shari'atmadari on questions of power and sovereignty. 
A fifth issue separating the two grand mujtahids was that of freedom of 
association, speech, and the press. Shari'atmadari reasoned that dissonant 
views could be boycotted but should not be violently suppressed. The matter 
arose over the famous Ayandigan affair, in which that newspaper linked 
existence of a terrorist organization, Furqan, to religious motivations. The 
publication of material on Furqan's ideology and activities, without however 
any accompanying editorial comment, released a flood of accusations by IRP- 
oriented clergy. Khumayni himself led IRP denunciations of the paper for 
printing what he regarded as anticlergy propaganda. In the end, a violent mob 
attack on the paper's plant led to casualties, the destruction of property, and 
the suspension of publication for a number of weeks. After a brief return to 
the newsstands under chastened circumstances, the paper was completely 
taken over by the IRP and renamed Azadigan. 
The divergence between the views of Khumayni and Shari'atmadari wid- 
ened in 1980 until the latter either was compelled or voluntarily withdrew into 
silence. Perhaps the most critical disagreement has been over the new con- 
stitution, approved in a December 1979 referendum, which transformed Iran 
into a theocratic state.33 Shari'atmadari's basic objection to the draft constitu- 
tion submitted to the nation by the Council of Experts stemmed from his belief 
that articles 5 and 110, pertaining to the power of the faqih (the supreme 
clerical leader), and the provisions of articles 6 and 56, relating to national 
sovereignty, contravened one another. Shari'atmadari trenchantly, if politely, 
maintained that Shi'i doctrine has no provision at all for the principle of 
vilayat-i faqih (rule exercised on behalf of the imam by the supreme clergy- 
man). Practically speaking, the need for afaqih can arise under extraordinary 
circumstances, he conceded. But once a chief executive is installed, a parlia- 
ment is elected, and the government receives the latter's vote of confidence, 
then the need for afaqih lapses. Yet, the draft constitution rendered the office 
offaqih a permanent fixture of the political system. In Shari'atmadari's view, 
however, even during the state of emergency the faqih's powers must be 
restricted, especially by assigning command of the armed forces to an 
accountable government official. Failing that, the problem of autocracy 
would arise once again.34 
These arguments contrasted sharply with the views expressed by Ayatullah 
Khumayni in his 1971 book, Islamic Government. There, he consistently 
demands clergy activism in politics, citing a hadith attributed to Imam 'Ali 
concerning the prophet's supplication to God to bless those coming after him. 
Asked who will be his successors, the prophet had responded, "Those who 
33 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Middle East Journal, 34:2 (Spring 1980), 
184-204. 
34 Khalq-i Musalman, 22 Mihr 1358 H. Sh./14 October 1979. 
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come after me who transmit my sayings and traditions and teach them to the 
people in my absence."35 Khumayni holds that the prophet intended the 
active teaching of his precepts to secure a dynamic and activist role for the 
men of religion in Islam. This was tantamount to a doctrinal directive for 
social action by the clergy. 
But Shari'atmadari-this time joined by the immensely popular Taliqani- 
demurred, countering that in his opinion clergy activism had produced so 
many problems that he appealed to them to return to the mosques.36 As if to 
underline that this statement was not fortuitous, he repeated it four months 
later, adding for good measure that to his mind the high clergy ought to avoid 
commerce, as well.37 
On the role of educators, Ayatullah Shari'atmadari nformed a group of 
visiting university professors at a time particularly trying for them that no 
group in society could serve it better than theirs.38 By contrast, Khumayni has 
furiously demanded a purge of the universities, condemning them for harbor- 
ing what he has termed communists, American agents, and imperialists.39 
On the Kurdish question, Shari'atmadari aligned himself with the RC emis- 
sary, Ayatullah Taliqani, who stood for negotiation and reconciliation with 
the Kurds.40 Khumayni, however, rejected Taliqani's recommendations, 
linked the Maoist Komela with the Kurdish Democratic Party in an un- 
differentiated "communist" alliance, and sent the Iranian revolutionary 
guards into the Kurdish cities. His feelings on this issue were so strong that he 
threatened to bring these guards before the revolutionary courts should they 
fail to suppress the Kurdish movement.4' 
Differences between the pair arose, too, on the taking of the American 
hostages. To Shari'atmadari, the action corresponded with revolutionary prax- 
is, but not with the laws and prescriptions of Islam.42 He held this view in the 
face of Khumayni's anti-American speeches during the week preceding the 
embassy capture. Khumayni's subsequent comments that the embassy had 
been a "nest of spies" and his warnings about imminent American interven- 
tion suggest that the action had his approval once it had taken place. 
35 Ruhullah al-Musavi Khumayni, Hukumat-i Islami (Najaf: Ashraf, 1391 H. Q./1971), 74ff. 
Emphasis supplied. 
36 IT, 18 Khurdad 1358 H. Sh./8 June 1979; 4 Aban 1358/26 October 1979. 
37 IT, 4 Aban 1358 H. Sh./26 October 1979. 
38 IT, 18 Aban 1358 H. Sh./9 November 1979. 
39 Iranshahr, 4 Urdibihisht 1359 H. Sh./24 April 1980; IT, 30 Aban 1359 H. Sh./21 Novem- 
ber 1980; IT, 5 Day 1359 H. Sh./26 December 1980; IT, 25 Urdibihisht 1360 H. Sh./15 May 
1981. Although clearly opposed to communism, Ayatullah Shari'atmadari has declared, as 
against Ayatullah Khumayni's position, "If the people should elect communists as representa- 
tives, it will be necessary to tolerate their existence." Ayandigan, 30 Tir 1358 H. Sh./21 July 
1979. 
40 Khalq-i Musalman, 22 Mihr 1358 H. Sh./14 October 1979. 
41 IT, 16 Shahrivar 1358 H. Sh./7 September 1979. 
42 IT, 9 Azar 1358 H. Sh./30 November 1979. 
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Other elements of difference between the grand mujtahids include Shari'at- 
madari's rebukes to IRP officials for seeking to monopolize power and for 
spreading a climate of revenge in the country.43 For Khumayni, monolithic 
unity appears as a categorical imperative, sustained by his threats to purge the 
bazaars, the ranks of the revolutionary guards, and even the revolutionary 
courts should they fail to evince sufficient revolutionary militance. His mili- 
tance informs even his more conciliatory moments, as when he appealed to 
dissenting clergymen to unite in the new regime to prevent "those sitting in 
Paris" from overthrowing the Islamic Republic. If these clerics did not desist, 
Khumayni admonished, the masses would know where duty lay in the face of 
their "treason."44 
Denying Khumayni's charge that the regime's problems were attributable 
to agents of imperialism, communism, and Zionism, Shari'atmadari ironically 
expressed his hope that the three million members of the MPP were not all 
"foreign agents."45 Shari'atmadari's greater moderation emerged not only in 
the context of his appeal to the IRP to let non-IRP groups operate in the open. 
It ultimately encompassed the question of the fate of the shah. To him, the 
physical return of the shah to Iran was unimportant, provided the wealth he 
had taken out of the country were restored to the Iranian people.46 But 
Ayatullah Khumayni's position was that the revolution would never be con- 
summated without putting the shah on trial and revealing the true nature of his 
rule to the world. A trial, for him, would mark the end of Western penetra- 
tion, expurgate past sins, and provide funds for development purposes. 
A number of other senior and junior clergymen also expressed dismay, 
anger, and criticism against the clergy leaders of the IRP. In some cases, the 
criticism was merely implied, as, for example, when Ayatullah Taliqani 
actually boycotted the meetings of the RC in the months preceding his death, 
despite his incumbency as its chairman.47 
In other instances, even relatives of Ayatullah Khumayni have lashed out at 
what they termed excesses of the hardline group. Thus, Khumayni's brother, 
Ayatullah Murtaza Pasandidah, objected to balloting irregularities in the par- 
liamentary elections in the spring of 1980. In riposte, the IRP Speaker of 
Parliament accused him of conspiring with the United States against the 
Islamic Republic.48 Earlier, Khumayni's son, Hujjat al-Islam Ahamd Khu- 
43 IT, 30 Azar 1358 H. Sh./21 December 1979. 
44 IT, 14 Shahrivar 1359 H. Sh./5 September 1980; IT, 14 Farvardin 1360 H. Sh./3 April 
1981; IT, 25 Urdibihisht 1360 H. Sh./15 May 1981. 
45 IT, 23 Azar 1358 H. Sh./14 December 1979. Suggesting that these individuals are patriots, 
Shari'atmadari again took issue with Ayatullah Khumayni's rejection of nationalist sentiment 
when he declared, "Love of one's homeland is a sound idea-a person's homeland is like his 
house." Ittila'at, 20 Khurdad 1358 H. Sh./10 June 1979. 
46 IT, 30 Azar 1358 H. Sh./21 December 1979. 
47 IT, 27 Mihr 1358 H. Sh./19 October 1979. 
48 IT, 15 Farvardin 1359 H. Sh./4 April 1980. 
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mayni, had spoken against the principle of vilayat-ifaqih during the delibera- 
tions on the draft constitution by the Council of Experts.49 
A more direct challenge came from Ayatullah Khumayni's grandson, Huj- 
jat al-Islam Husayn Khumayni, who openly declared that 90 percent of the 
Iranian clergy rejected the IRP faction and were in support of the then Presi- 
dent Bani Sadr against it. Warning against the possibility of a "Chile-type 
dictatorship," he delivered the charge that the members of this faction had 
"proven themselves fascists whose actions had brought the state to the verge 
of collapse."50 
But more serious are the defections from the IRP line which have occurred 
among highly influential and respected mujtahids with records of activities 
against the shah. In Mashhad, the country's second holy city, Ayatullah 
Hasan Taba'taba'i Qummi accused the IRP 'ulama' (clergy) of having "lost 
their way from the true Islam." In his view, ignorant, corrupt, and merciless 
officials controlled the revolutionary courts, and unless a purge of state in- 
stitutions were undertaken to eliminate the IRP's role there, matters would 
continue to worsen. Ayatullah Khumayni indirectly rebutted Qummi's state- 
ments by linking anti-IRP clergy in Qumm and Mashhad to the shah's coun- 
terrevolutionary activities and threatening them with action by revolutionary 
tribunals. Undeterred, Qummi angrily judged the constitution to be in vio- 
lation of Islamic law and held articles 107-112, relating to the powers of the 
faqih and other 'ulama', to be mutually contradictory.5' 
Comments from other senior mujtahids have been equally negative, al- 
though in some cases the tone has been milder than in others. The popular 
teacher of Qumm's madrasahs, Ayatullah Nasir Makarim Shirazi, early criti- 
cized the concept of vilayat-i faqih in deliberations within the Council of 
Experts. Attempting to reject the principle without condemning Ayatullah 
Khumayni, Shirazi warned against the concentration of power and autocracy. 
Recalling that essentially unarmed masses had successfully made the revolu- 
tion, Makarim subtly argued that making the faqih commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces would be a violation of the trust accruing to the Iranian people. 
After all, if armed might were a legitimate means of maintaining a political 
system, then the shah would still be in power.52 
In blunter language, Ayatullah Abu al-Fazl Musavi Zanjani condemned the 
"despotic power" vested in the faqih.53 His brother, Ayatullah Riza Musavi 
49 IT, 4 Aban 1358 H. Sh./26 October 1979. It is true he did so on technical, not substantive, 
grounds. If, as was possible, the faqih were not an Iranian, what would he do in case of war 
between Iran and his home country, given that he would be commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces? If he were to order Iranian mobilization, he would be warring against his own country; if 
he demurred, he would be a traitor to Iran. 
50 IT, 14 Farvardin 1360 H. Sh./3 April 1981; IT, 4 Urdibihisht 1360 H. Sh./24 April 1981. 
51 IT, 1 Farvardin 1360 H. Sh./21 March 1981. 
52 Khalq-i Musalman, 22 Mihr 1358/14 October 1979. 
53 Voice of America, Persian language broadcast, 22 March 1981. 
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Zanjani, a supporter of former Prime Minister Musaddiq and having close ties 
to the then late Ayatullah Taliqani, denounced the "murders committed in the 
name of Islam" during the revolution. Referring to the visit by Ayatullahs 
Mahallati and Qummi to the home of Ayatullah Khumayni to submit a list of 
clergy grievances to the latter, he ironically concluded, "but they left without 
results."54 
A second distinguished member of the Mashhad 'ulama' who has been 
vocal in his criticism of the IRP is Hujjat al-Islam 'Ali Tihrani; despite his 
evident standing within the religious institution in the country, Tihrani has 
repeatedly forbidden his followers to call him Ayatullah. To his mind, 
Ayatullah Khumayni had "trampled upon Islam" and ignored his ownfatwas 
in what Tihrani saw to be calculated moves to retain power. Tihrani rebuked 
Khumayni for suggesting that the Qur'an contained an exhaustive discussion 
of the Islamic law of retaliation, noting that even were that true, it would be 
"obscene" to have parliament enact those provisions, as though the Qur'an 
required ratification by positive law. Tihrani also joined the issue of the extent 
of popular clerical support for the IRP, declaring: 
This group is merely a small minority under the leadership of Ayatullah Bihishti. 
They are not the real clergymen of the Shi'i rite of Islam. I am conversant with their 
past and know that they have not even acquired a sound religious education .... All 
genuine clergymen oppose them and have kept silent only out of respect for Ayatullah 
Khumayni. . . . [The IRP's] supporters in reality are a group of fourteen persons who 
teach in Qumm. Most of them are not real teachers and cannot even be considered 
specialists in Islamic sciences. Qumm's real teachers, who number more than three 
hundred, oppose the IRP. . . . Even the group of fourteen has split and some of them 
have now joined the circle of Ayatullah [Muhammad Riza] Gulpaygani [one of the 
country's eminent mujtahids].55 
Criticisms of the IRP by senior clergymen have not been localized. Mash- 
had, Tabriz, and Shiraz appear as main centers of contention against the 
behavior of that faction's members. This is bound to be worrisome for the 
regime, given the historic importance of those three cities in the political 
history of the country.56 
In Mashhad, Ayatullah Abu al-Hasan Shirazi has blamed the various revo- 
lutionary organs for "directly or indirectly causing convulsions," maintain- 
ing that "circumstances have slowly become worse than before. People have 
become desperate and are asking each other: 'Where can we turn to?' "57 
In a similar vein, the pro-Shari'atmadari mujtahid of Tabriz, Ayatullah 
Yusuf Hashimi Hukmabadi, remonstrated: "With the things that people are 
54 IT, 2 Murdad 1360 H. Sh./24 July 1981. 
55 IT, 26 Tir 1360 H. Sh./17 July 1981; IT, 9 Murdad 1360 H. Sh./31 July 1981. 
56 Denouncing the concentration of power in Qumm, Ayatullah Abu al-Hasan Shirazi of 
Mashhad reminded his audience that his city was the site of the tomb of the eighth Imam, a claim 
no other Iranian city could make. IT, 28 Farvardin 1360 H. Sh./17 April 1981. 
57 IT, 25 Urdibihisht 1360 H. Sh./15 May 1981. 
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doing, not only will infidels not become Muslims, but Muslims will flee 
Islam."58 In Shiraz, Ayatullah Baha' al-Din Mahallati, an old ally of Khu- 
mayni during the 1963 disturbances, broadly condemned the regime elite, 
saying, "Right now, in the Islamic country of Iran, demagoguery, idolatry, 
severe repression, fraud, flattery, tampering with [others'] ideas, statements 
and writings, bribery, obscenities, mendacity and recriminations are wildly 
circulating."59 
And within the regime itself, factional rifts have emerged among the cler- 
gy. One of the reasons for clergy rebellion against the shah had been his 
failure ever to implement article 2 of the old constitution, which had stipu- 
lated the creation of a council of mujtahids to certify the compatibility of 
legislation with Islamic law. An early action, therefore, by Ayatullah Khu- 
mayni, was to appoint six mujtahids directly to a new revolutionary institu- 
tion, the Council of Guardians of the Constitution, and to approve the nomi- 
nation of six others by his colleagues. Among his own nominees was his old 
colleague and ally from the period of antishah activities, Ayatullah Rabani 
Shirazi. The Council of Guardians has in fact repeatedly rejected IRP land 
reform legislation on the grounds that Islamic law categorically protects pri- 
vate ownership of property. After many months of deadlock, the IRP leader- 
ship prevailed on Ayatullah Khumayni to intervene, and he has vested parlia- 
ment with certain of his powers as faqih, empowering the legislature to 
override the objections of the Council of Guardians. This has caused signifi- 
cant deepening in the cleavages within the IRP faction itself, as certain IRP 
stalwarts have become disenchanted with the party's basic policy on land 
tenure.60 
Despite these defections from the IRP line, members of the IRP faction 
have continued to dominate political power. The leaders of the IRP clergy 
have included Ayatullah Husayn 'Ali Muntaziri (Khumayni's designated suc- 
cessor), Ayatullah Bihishti (killed in June 1981), Ayatullah Yahya Nuri, 
Ayatullah 'Ali Qudusi (revolutionary prosecutor-general until his assassina- 
tion in September 1981), Ayatullah 'Abd al-Karim Ardabili (chairman of the 
State Supreme Court), and Ayatullah Kani. 
Below this tier of senior clergymen have been Hujjat al-Islam Rafsanjani, 
Hujjat al-Islam Javad Bahunar (prime minister), Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad 
'Ali Khamanah'i (president). In the third echelon are the preachers, influential 
mobilizers of mass opinion and social action: Hujjat al-Islam Sadiq Khalkhali, 
leader of the militant fundamentalist movement, the Fida'iyan-i Islam, with its 
connection to the lutis (street toughs) and activists known as the hizbullahi 
(those of the Party of God); and Hujjat al-Islam Hadi Ghafari, now deceased, 
58 Khalq-i Musalman, 22 Mihr 1358 H. Sh./14 October 1979. 
59 IT, 25 Urdibihisht 1360 H. Sh./15 May 1981. 
60 IT, 1 Aban 1360 H. Sh./23 October 1981. 
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who had threatened anti-IRP members of parliament with assassination and 
acquired a certain following. Two other tertiary clerical leaders may be men- 
tioned: Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Taqi Falsafi, a strongly anti-Musaddiq 
preacher having close ties to clerical circles identified with the late Ayatullah 
Abu al-Qasim Kashani (d. 1962), himself a militant activist in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s; and finally, Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Khu'ayniha, spir- 
itual guide of the "students of the Imam's line," that is, of those who 
captured the American diplomats and the embassy in November 1979. His 
importance is reflected in the rapid rise of his clients to positions of impor- 
tance in the revolutionary regime, especially in the Ministry of Foreign Af- 
fairs and the intelligence service.61 
Organizationally, the IRP was the instrument of Ayatullah Bihishti. He 
utilized his supporters in the IRP in a pragmatic manner to establish the party 
as the most powerful institution outside the state. Withal, Bihishti was not 
able consistently to control IRP members, especially individuals such as 
Khalkhali, who had their own independent base of support. His organizational 
talents apparently overrode any suspicions that may have existed among his 
colleagues about the loose nature of his ideological commitments. Such suspi- 
cions had derived from his contacts with the shah's clients before the revolu- 
tion, his contacts with officials of the American State Department, and his 
meeting with General Robert Huyser, whom President Jimmy Carter had 
dispatched to Iran in December 1978.62 Moreover, he seemed to be inconsis- 
tent on the issue of the hostages, speaking of the need to free them, trying to 
prevent their transfer into government custody (in an attempt to embarrass 
Bani Sadr), and finally urging that they be tried.63 
Bihishti's calculations for the organization of power were predicated on his 
beliefs that the clergy would not long maintain the unquestioned loyalty of the 
masses; the clergy should rapidly establish a theocracy; the 'ulama' ought to 
cast the "liberals" (that is, Bani Sadr, Bazargan, Yazdi, Nazih, and others) 
as the scapegoats for regime failures; and the Soviet Union would avoid 
entanglement in Iran because of the Afghan and Polish crises. In the last 
analysis, Bihishti remained a nondoctrinaire leader, whereas his successors 
are more sectarian and dogmatic while lacking his organizational abilities.64 
In Bihishti's absence, the IRP has proceeded in a somewhat rudderless 
fashion. Conflicts between so-called Maktabi and Hujjati factions have split 
the party since his death. As already noted, disagreements have divided the 
TRP over land reform. Beyond this conflict may be mentioned the growing 
61 IT, 2 Bahman 1360 H. Sh./22 January 1982. 
62 IT, 10 Isfand 1358 H. Sh./29 February 1980; IT, 4 Mihr 1359 H. Sh./26 September 1980; 
IT, 20 Tir 1359 H. Sh./ll July 1980. 
63 IT, 13 Tir 1359 H. Sh./4 July 1980; IT, 14 Shahrivar 1359 H. Sh./5 September 1980; IT, 1 
Farvardin 1359 H. Sh./21 March 1980. 
64 IT, 19 Tir 1360 H. Sh./10 July 1981. 
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disenchantment of the parliamentary IRP members with the cabinet IRP fig- 
ures over the nonimplementation of legislation. Such enactments as the laws 
on allowable activities of political parties, on doctor-patient relations, and on 
purges of ancien regime officials in the state apparatus have gone without 
implementation. Demands for a government report on the action of the Foun- 
dation for the Deprived in its administration of corporations and factories have 
gone unheeded.65 While it would be inappropriate to label this conflict one of 
"left" (the parliamentary IRP) against "right" (the cabinet IRP), it does 
appear as though revolutionary militance is reflected in the legislature's praxis 
while the government strives for a breathing spell of relaxation in revolution- 
ary zeal.66 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article has examined both the ideology and praxis of Shi'ism in the 
revolution which produced the Islamic Republic of Iran. It has suggested that 
the revolution was the product of three factors: (1) certain doctrinal trends that 
have permitted great involvement of the religious leadership in politics, (2) 
popular and dramaturgical elements of Shi'ism which relate to the social 
integration of the community, and (3) political expression and social action by 
individuals and organizations in reaction to structural changes in society, in a 
context where the respective interpretations of Shi'ism, corporate interests, 
and the public good have varied widely. 
Born out of protest against the Pahlavi corporatist state, the revolution has 
provided grounds for confrontation and controversy among those who ac- 
tively brought it about. The new theocratic state certainly reversed the trend, 
prominent in the post-1963 period, toward increasing bureaucratization of 
power. The new state structure differs from the old in a double sense: it is, so 
far, weaker than its predecessor, but its leaders also aspire to have it penetrate 
the lives of the people more extensively than its counterpart under the shah. In 
any revolution, of course, the state is at least originally weakened, and 
whether or not the theocratic state order of the Islamic Republic will be able to 
organize the lives of Iranians according to desired patterns of equality, capaci- 
ty, solidarity, and stability cannot yet be determined. 
What is clear is that the clergy have acted in a manner unprecedented in 
Iran's history. While doctrine provided sanction to the clergy's role as mem- 
65 IT, 18 Day 1360 H. Sh./8 January 1982. 66 Since the original draft of this article was written, the situation has reversed. The more 
militant IRP faction is now dominant in the cabinet and party organs (Politburo, General Secre- 
tariat, Central Committee). The less militant appear in significant numbers in the parliament and 
judiciary. See Shahrough Akhavi, "Clerical Politics in Iran since 1979" in The Iranian Revolu- 
tion and the Islamic Republic: New Assessments, Nikki Keddie and Kathleen Manalo, eds. 
(Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, forthcoming). This essay was originally presented 
as a paper to the Conference on the Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic, Smithsonian 
Institution, Woodrow Wilson Center, 22-23 May 1982. 
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bers of the general agency (al-wikalah al-'ammah), social action by the clergy 
since 1978 has, by going as far as the assumption of executive leadership 
positions in the state administration, transcended the limits the 'ulama' set for 
themselves in earlier times. In the process, much controversy has emerged 
over doctrinal principles and the uses to which such principles have been put 
in practice. 
Paralleling these disputes has been the clergy's stimulation, by word and 
deed, of the messianic expectations of Iranian Shi'ites. The passion play has 
played a central role in the dynamics of the Iranian revolution. Its message is 
unambiguous, unlike the difficult and in a sense stylized intellectual discourse 
of the mujtahids over the Imamate, vilayat, and impious rule. The principles 
at the center of these concepts furnished the clergy with the tactical power 
needed to mobilize the masses. But the messianic elements and themes pro- 
vided the operational mechanism of the mobilization. 
The very high degree of factionalism exhibited by social actors in the 
Iranian revolution is complicated, furthermore, by the tendency of individuals 
to have differing orientations within a particular ("leftist," "moderate," or 
"rightist") perspective. Thus, on a variety of issues, including communal 
relations, due process, civil rights, constitutionalism, autocracy, corruption, 
and intraelite relations, a high level of conflict has been characteristic of the 
last five years. 
This essay may have conveyed the impression that the Iranian revolution 
has been somehow principally about Shi'ism. Such a conclusion is inaccurate. 
There is no attempt here to say or imply that Shi'ism "caused" the revolution. 
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber wrote, 
We have no intention whatever of maintaining such a foolish and doctrinaire thesis as 
that the spirit of capitalism . . . could only have arisen as the result of certain effects 
of the Reformation. . . [W]e only wish to ascertain whether and to what extent 
religious forces have taken part in the qualitative formation and the quantitative expan- 
sion of that spirit over the world.67 
The same thought applies, mutatis mutandis, in the present essay. The only 
intent is to determine the nature of the clergy's role in the revolution and to 
account for their mutual relations during its course. 
Shi'ism has proven a difficult concept and practice for the sociologist of 
religion to grasp. Like the proverbial blind men trying to fathom the identity 
of the elephant they are touching, the social actors in the Iranian revolution 
also appear to be reaching different conclusions. In the process, they seem to 
be altering their discourse, as well. Simultaneously, shifting and even unprin- 
cipled coalitions, which have characterized the social reality of the revolution 
since its inception, continue to appear. The analyst of the Iranian revolution, 
67 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1958), 91. 
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therefore, can only try to record the variations and seek explanation of their 
meaning in the cultural and social contexts of Iranian history. What remains 
certain is that the social actors have not only attributed widely differing 
meanings to a corpus of doctrine that has evolved over the centuries, but, just 
as important, their modes of behavior have been so divergent that it often 
comes as a surprise to recall that Shi'ism is, after all, their common point of 
reference. 
